Constitutional Efforts in Resolving Disputes Regional Elections in Indonesia

Abstract

The pattern of regional head election dispute resolution still adheres to a centralized system, which is carried out by institutions at the central level, despite the fact that regional head elections are a regional government matter rather than a central government issue. This study aims to outline the urgency and challenges of decentralizing the settlement of election disputes. At the same time, it offers an ideal design for election dispute resolution based on a decentralized model, addressing aspects such as relief, competence, and procedural law. This research employs a normative approach, utilizing statutory provisions, concepts, and case studies. The centralization of electoral dispute resolution has implications for regime misalignment, leading to a corrupt judicial process and requiring high accommodation costs. The antithesis to the centralized model of dispute resolution is decentralization, which entails adjudicating electoral disputes at the regional level, corresponding to the location where the election takes place. This alignment ensures consistency between the dispute resolution regime and the electoral regime. The decentralization model begins with establishing judicial institutions at the regional level, defining both absolute and relative competence, and outlining procedural law. Key elements of this model include subjectum litis, objectum litis, and decision-making processes.